江西财经大学财税与公共管理学院,江西,南昌,330013
纸质出版:2015
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李胜. 基于制度分析的跨行政区流域水污染治理绩效优化研究[J]. 水土保持通报, 2015,35(2):246-250.
LI Sheng. A Study of Trans-district Basin Water Pollution Control Performance and Optimization Based on Institutional Analysis[J]. Bulletin of Soiland Water Conservation, 2015, 35(2): 246-250.
李胜. 基于制度分析的跨行政区流域水污染治理绩效优化研究[J]. 水土保持通报, 2015,35(2):246-250. DOI: 10.13961/j.cnki.stbctb.2015.02.047.
LI Sheng. A Study of Trans-district Basin Water Pollution Control Performance and Optimization Based on Institutional Analysis[J]. Bulletin of Soiland Water Conservation, 2015, 35(2): 246-250. DOI: 10.13961/j.cnki.stbctb.2015.02.047.
[目的] 从制度是博弈的规则角度分析影响跨行政区流域水污染治理绩效的症结
旨在为提高流域水环境质量提供规则建议。[方法] 通过对《环境保护法》、《水法》、《水污染防治法》相关法律条款和水资源管理体制进行分析
以及对中国水环境质量状况进行调查。[结果] 条块分割
多头管理
缺乏协调机制的流域管理体制及制度安排已难以适应污水排放量急剧增长和解决日渐频繁的跨区域性流域水污染事件的需要
而环境法制执行力的缺失进一步使嵌入经济和政治双重竞争博弈的地方政府容易采取保护污染企业和转嫁污染等恶性竞争手段
使流域陷入公地悲剧的非理性均衡。[结论] 提高跨行政区流域水污染治理绩效需要进一步完善博弈规则设计
提高制度执行力以承诺行动的方式提高中央政策的可信性和有效性
建立"河长制"
创新流域产权及完善异地开发补偿制度。
[Objective] Attempts from the perspective of institutionalism to investigate the crux of trans district water pollution control performance
and provide suggestions to improve the basin water environment quality.[Methods] Through analyzing performance of relevant legal provisions of "Environmental Protection Law"
"Water Law"
"Water Pollution Prevention Law"
and water resources management system
and carried on the investigation to the water pollution of China.[Results] River basin management system and institutions arrangement
including regional segmentation
bull management
lack of coordination mechanism were insufficient to meet the need of solving sharp growth of waste and the increasing trans-regional water pollution incidents. The lack of environmental legal institutional execution caused vicious competition between local governments that involved in economic and political competition games
and eventually led to irrational equilibrium and the tragedy of the commons.[Conclusion] Improve the trans-district water pollution performance needs further perfecting the game design to improving institutions implementation
and adapt commitment action to improve the credibility and effectiveness of central government's policy
and through establishing accountability system
innovating basin property right and ecological compensation to improving control performance.
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